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“The Arrow Cross did not bother with 
women. Women were not partners for 
them. During the interrogations, I did not 
meet a single Arrow Cross woman. And you 
are saying this only now [that 10 percent of 
Arrow Cross party members were women]. 
Why didn’t you tell me this thirty-five years 
ago, when I could have swooped down on 
them?”
This was the answer I received from a former officer of 
the State Protection Authority, Hungary’s secret police 
(Államvédelmi Hatóság or ÁVH), when I asked him, dur-
ing a 2007 interview, about Arrow Cross women. From 
1949 to 1973, this man had investigated domestic reac-
tionary forces (that is, war criminals and Arrow Cross 
members). The quote illustrates the dilemma that 
researchers face when they inquire into phenomena 
the very existence of which many deny. At the Central 
European University, quantitative researchers have 
begun work on documents stemming from the Buda-
pest People’s Tribunal — documents that have been 
preserved in the Budapest City Archives. This research 
represents the first systematic inquiry into the opera-
tion of the People’s Tribunals. In light of the initial find-
ings, we may reassess the views that experts and the 
broader public have held on transitional justice and 
draw attention to previously neglected gender aspects 
of right-wing radicalism.
The DebaTe on  
The PeoPle’s Tribunals
In recent years, the analysis of World War II history has 
once again taken political center stage in the former 
Eastern Bloc countries. In Hungary, the debate about 
criminalizing Holocaust denial was resumed, partly in 
response to the advance of far-right political organi-
zations whose internal group cohesion is confirmed 
through Holocaust denial. In Hungary, the debate over 
who was responsible for the losses in World War II and 
for the murder of 600,000 Hungarian Jews — or rather 
the absence of such a debate — has caused a split in the 
nation’s collective memory. After World War II, at the 
very outset of the democratic transition, the Hungarian 
People’s Tribunals were to draw a distinction among 
prewar, wartime, and postwar values. The courts that 
investigated war crimes in Europe, and later in Japan, 
served the function of defining, in legal terms, such 
crimes and of punishing offenders. In Hungary, the 
courts were only half-successful in this endeavor. An 
inquiry into why this was so may help us re-evaluate 
various elements of the nation’s collective memory.
In Hungary, the post-Holocaust jurisdiction — the 
1945 Act on People’s Tribunals — was established 
haphazardly. For this reason, the 1945 Act became 
controversial. It was criticized on legal as well as po-
litical grounds. The 1945 Act on People’s Tribunals 
was a rough sketch; the newly appointed judges, who 
lacked experience, had to interpret it. Court cases were 
undertaken quickly, sometimes without thorough pre-
liminary investigation, for it was virtually impossible 
to carry through such investigations in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. The primary objective was to pre-
vent people from taking the law into their own hands. 
Later, as the postwar situation stabilized and the politi-
cal climate hardened due to the Cold War, new legisla-
tion was introduced in order to regulate the function 
of people’s tribunals more strictly. Act VII of 1946 was 
followed by Act XXXIV of 1947, which regulated the 
proceedings.1
Critics of the work of the People’s Tribunals in Hun-
gary have used both legal and political arguments to 
define the tribunals’ shortcomings.2 The legal critique 
focuses on these courts’ failure to function in a “legal” 
manner. They were, in fact, political tribunals, for they 
introduced retrospective justice. The first questions 
raised about the legal basis of the Tribunals pointed to 
the fact that international pressure had led to the intro-
duction of retrospective justice. This was not in con-
formity with the Hungarian legal tradition. Meanwhile, 
political critiques bring up the fact that the country 
was under Soviet occupation. They both condemn the 
courts (as promoters of the Communist takeover) for 
their excessive rigor, and fault the Communists for be-
ing too lenient in their treatment of minor Arrow Cross 
figures and war criminals who had played a minor “his-
torical role”.
It is possible to escape from this discourse by con-
ducting a gender-based analysis that shifts the focus of 
the investigation. Here, we move from the examination 
of major representative or emblematic aspects to a 
focus on less momentous issues, while integrating the 
gender approach. Until now, historians have generally 
focused on emblematic “big cases” while ignoring the 
gender factor — as we see in the statement made by the 
member of the secret police at the beginning of this 
article.3
The CourTs
What are the attractions of this new form of analysis? In 
line with the traditions of women’s history, it provides, 
first and foremost, the opportunity simply to search 
out women and make them visible within the institu-
tions that produced the documentation which is now 
available. In other words, historians can do research 
on the documentation that institutions produced in the 
course of their work. 
Such institutions include the People’s Tribunals, in 
which lawyers, judges, and public prosecutors were 
active. But this traditional, historical, descriptive ap-
proach is apparently far from simple, even as far as 
the courts are concerned, for the obvious reason that 
the legal profession was a male profession. Moreover, 
when it comes to their experience of the country’s 
liberation, Hungary’s lawyers were divided right down 
the middle. Prior to 1914, law was not only a respect-
able livelihood for the middle classes; it also offered 
men upward mobility in society. There was only one 
semester, after the 1918 revolution and while Mihály 
Károlyi was prime minister, during which female law 
students could apply for admission to law school. The 
women who were accepted were allowed to complete 
their studies, though various special permits were 
required.4 It is interesting to follow the careers of the 
women lawyers who, complying with the gender-based 
division of the legal profession, dealt with social mat-
ters or worked as people’s public prosecutors (since 
they were, as women, considered innocent). The femi-
nization of the law profession after 1945 coincided with 
the expansion of “Communist law” and a devaluation 
of the role of law. Women were encouraged to study 
law because they were seen as reliable. They began to 
graduate from the university and receive important 
positions in the newly transformed state apparatus.
arrow Cross 
women aCTivisTs
According to membership records, estimated 15,000 
women were members of the Arrow Cross Party in 
Hungary. After the war, these women were interned or 
imprisoned because they had supported the occupy-
ing German forces, or been collaborators. German and 
Austrian historians are alone in having studied women 
who were active in right-wing political parties.5 A per-
tinent question is: why did these women join a radical 
and marginal party with an obviously anti-woman 
program, a party that wished to keep women in the 
home?”6
My research, which is carried out in cooperation 
with Ildikó Barna (ELTE, Budapest), has shown that, 
in Budapest, women accounted for 10 percent of those 
indicted for war crimes.7 This percentage corresponds 
roughly to today’s female-to-male ratio in Hungarian 
public life, that is, Hungary’s political parties and par-
liament. In the pre-1945 period, however, women par-
ticipated only sporadically in public life, so a ratio of 10 
percent is relatively high. In the 20th century, women 
made up a steadily increasing proportion of the total 
number of war crime offenders — from 3 percent at the 
turn of the century to 10 percent in 1990. Today, their 
share is 16 percent. In Hungary, during World War II, a 
large number of armed and uniformed women made 
their appearance on the public stage.
As far as its potential field of mobilization was con-
cerned, the Arrow Cross Party resembled the Com-
munist party. It is important to note that the party was 
formed under the regime of Miklós Horthy, in a political 
environment that was hostile to women. After World 
War I, public discourse portrayed women in general, 
and especially “the new kind of women”, as unreliable 
and dangerous actors who threatened male hegem-
ony in the economic, political and cultural spheres. 
This was the argument underlying the restriction of 
women’s right to higher education.8 The improved 
political position and greater significance of women 
jeopardized the authority of the pre-1918 political elite. 
After women had been granted limited voting rights in 
1920, the National Association of Hungarian Women 
(MANSZ), which had been established in 1918 by Cecil 
Tormay (1875–1937), became an umbrella organization 
that mobilized middle-class and upper-middle-class 
women. In doing so, it served to prevent the progress 
of both left-wing and right-wing radicalism. During the 
debate on the electoral law in 1938, it became clear that 
far-right groups — who, like the left-wing groups, fought 
for expanded voting rights — were gaining strength. It 
became increasingly difficult to argue that voting rights 
should be extended to select individuals on the basis of 
merit and service, especially if one takes into conside-
ration that Hungary was the only European country 
in which the number of people entitled to vote actu-
ally fell during the interwar period. Among the various 
politicians, Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös (1886–1936), 
who was enamored with Italy’s fascist regime, was the 
first to engage in women’s political mobilization; he 
featureessay interview reviews
arrow Cross 
women anD female 
informanTs
A gender analysis of  
the Hungarian People’s 
Tribunals  in the  
aftermath of World War II
BY andrea petö
Woman as perpetrator can escape even a trained eye. What escaped her eye? people’s courts were created, and arrived at their decisions, in haste. But is it then reasonable to drag out the retroactive anguish?
50 51
established a separate political party for women. The 
Arrow Cross followed his example. 
The Arrow Cross Party was composed of many 
smaller, divided and marginalized groups and par-
ties. Thanks to the personal abilities and ambitions of 
Ferenc Szálasi, these splinter groups were united in 
one party in September 1940. The Arrow Cross Party’s 
organization was extremely hierarchical and rigid. The 
women’s section was to be found two organizational 
levels below the middle, on the same level as the youth 
section. The women’s function was evidently to secure 
the support of the mass membership; the Arrow Cross 
leadership seems to have recognized the political use-
fulness of its women members. Several different kinds 
of membership were open to women: full membership, 
supporting membership and even secret membership. 
The goal was to further women’s political engagement. 
Male Arrow Cross Party leaders joined the leaders of 
other political parties in seeking to limit the female 
members’ activities to the social field. Press reports in-
dicate, however, that women members were not satis-
fied with this: they too wished to be active in politics.9 
However, if women members of the Arrow Cross “took 
themselves seriously”, that is, if they behaved as the 
equals of men, they were immediately expelled from 
the party headquarters. There was no room for women 
in the inner circles of the party leadership or in the 
decision-making process. Even so, official Arrow Cross 
rhetoric defined “women” as strong and active. 
The Arrow Cross movement faced significant op-
position; its members were imprisoned and scorned 
not only by the country’s conservative elite, but by 
the Germans as well, at least up until the final phase 
of the war. The movement was meant to socialize its 
members so that they would be prepared for the time 
when they would have to take action. The hour struck 
on October 15, 1944, when Hungary’s leader, Horthy, 
failed in his attempts to get the country out of the war 
and thus paved the way for an Arrow Cross takeover 
similar to the one accomplished by Quisling in Norway. 
It is interesting to note, however, that during the brief 
period that the party held government positions, the 
women — who had worked untiringly (and sometimes 
even secretly) for the Arrow Cross Party — were imme-
diately pushed aside.
When analyzing the history of the war, scholars 
of gender studies have tended to regard women as 
victims and underdogs. It is evident, however, that Ar-
row Cross women could be violent, punching people 
or shooting Jews and throwing them into the Danube. 
For such women, it was essential to obtain and exercise 
power. In this way, they avoided the role of the victim, a 
role that served as a starting point for many in religious, 
leftwing, and feminist movements. 
During the course of the People’s Tribunals, which 
were pursued with great diligence by the Hungarian 
Communist Party, now part of the governing coalition, 
it was thought essential to stress the old political re-
gime’s culpability. During the trials, female war crimi-
nals were almost automatically branded “Arrow Cross 
members” — even those who had never been party 
members.10 Some of these women had merely seized 
the opportunity to rob and murder while there was a 
state of war, in the hope of avoiding punishment. The 
Arrow Cross women were not women in uniform. 
They did not serve in armed units. Nevertheless, in the 
discourse of the People’s Tribunals, the archetypal “Ar-
row Cross woman” was portrayed as a bloodthirsty and 
depraved individual. 
It is difficult to estimate how many women were 
members of the Arrow Cross, not only because there 
are no available membership files but also because, in 
Hungary, the “Arrow Cross” label was used freely in 
public discourse and during trials. Arrow Cross mem-
bership cards were rarely found during house searches; 
the People’s Tribunals usually found it sufficient if 
a witness stated that he or she had seen the accused 
wearing an Arrow Cross armband. The People’s Tribu-
nal would then declare the accused a “member of the 
Arrow Cross Party”, a factor that added to the gravity of 
his or her crime. Furthermore, during the chaotic, final 
months of the war, almost anyone had been able to ob-
tain an Arrow Cross armband. Indeed, as the Red Army 
approached, there had been no need for — or even any 
possibility of — official party membership or admission 
procedures. Arrow Cross “membership” was a political 
label rather than a real category. 
memory PoliTiCs:  
forgeTTing anD  
The failure To DisClose
One reason why female war criminals have been left 
out of historical memory is related to the gender-typi-
cal characteristics of the post–World War II period and 
the demise of the “matriarchy born of need”. Now, wo-
men who violated the patriarchal norm by wearing a 
uniform or by being active in public space were dealt 
with in a public and exemplarily strict manner. They 
were to be pushed back to their “normal” place.11  After 
1945, however, robbers, looters, and murderers as well 
as the female relatives of party members made their ap-
pearance, because they fitted into a public discourse 
that sought to restore the male-dominated social order 
that had been upset by the war. 
Another reason was that women with criminal 
records, who came from the lower social classes and 
who used the Arrow Cross movement either to take 
vengeance on their adversaries,13 or to enrich them-
selves by looting property abandoned by Jews, could 
not be regarded as “success stories” and so received 
less publicity.14 The majority of the women convicted 
of war crimes were, in fact, merely common criminals. 
Historians have ignored these women, as they had 
no “political” significance. As Norman Naimark has 
argued,15 ethnic cleansing is always linked to war. In 
the chaos that ensues, paramilitary units — in this case, 
the Arrow Cross — become the instruments of political 
leaders. Ethnic cleansing is also associated with crimes 
against property, as it provides opportunities for loot-
ing.16 
In accordance with the historical canon, the “more 
famous” of the female war criminals and Arrow Cross 
women, such as Gizella Lutz, wife of Arrow Cross party 
leader Ferenc Szálasi, as well as the famous actress 
Sári Fedák, feature in the historical accounts alongside 
the female perpetrators of the mass murder on Maros 
Street. This supports the fallacious belief that all the 
female members of Arrow Cross were middle-class and 
lower-middle-class women who, lacking professional 
aspirations of their own, passively joined the party un-
der the influence of male relatives, husbands, siblings 
and fathers. Or that, in addition to these misguided 
victims of male manipulation, the Arrow Cross move-
ment’s female membership was made up of a number 
of sadistic, insane women, who would later become 
pathological murderers. 
 
whaT The DaTa show:  
The silenT majoriTy
As part of our research, we went through documents 
relating to women tried by the People’s Tribunal in Bu-
dapest. Of these women, twenty-one percent were born 
before 1896, more than half between 1896 and 1914 and 
the remaining, close to one-fifth, after 1914. The data 
show that the proportion of middle-class women in this 
group was significantly higher (20 percent) than in the 
general population. Most of those accused by the Peo-
ple’s Tribunal were middle-aged women who had been 
educated and socialized under the Horthy regime. 
Four-fifths of the women were born in Hungary, 
while one-fifth were born in areas that Hungary had 
ceded to other countries in compliance with the Treaty 
of Trianon (1920). The proportion of women born out-
side of Hungary was thus significantly higher than in 
the population as a whole, where the figure was 7 per-
cent. Coming from outside the country’s Trianon bor-
ders may have had significant bearing on the women’s 
political radicalism. The left-wing’s alternative paths to 
a radical transformation of society, offered by the trade 
union, social-democratic and Communist movements, 
were closed to these women, since for them the nation-
al question was of central significance. Accordingly, 
they chose to direct their political activities towards 
political organizations that offered them social integra-
tion and which were responsive to their grievances.
We did not, however, detect a link between the time 
of the trial and the geographic origin of the accused 
women: there is no correlation between the year when 
the women were indicted and their having originated 
from inside or outside of Hungary. 
An analysis of the data according to the type of settle-
ment from which the accused women originated 
reveals that women from small towns are over-rep-
resented. Ten percent of the women belonged to this 
category — which is more than one would expect based 
on the ratio for the general population. Women from 
cities (nagyvárosok) were under-represented by 7 per-
cent and those from small towns (nagyközségek) were 
under-represented by 5 percent. 
Because different categories were used, it is not easy 
to compare the data from the People’s Tribunals to that 
provided by the census. However, a large proportion of 
the women found in the database belonged to intellec-
tual professions. In 1941, only 6 of percent Hungary’s 
female wage earners worked as public servants or in in-
tellectual professions; the corresponding ratio among 
the women indicted was at least one in five.17 This is an 
important piece of data, because women with good 
contacts — most of whom were intellectuals — often 
avoided prosecution. Moreover, the list of women con-
victed by the People’s Tribunals does not include Ar-
row Cross women who published articles in the Arrow 
Cross newspapers from the 1930s and onwards. These 
women fled to the West. Because they were not “impor-
tant”, no attempt was made to have them extradited, 
and so they were left out of history. (They returned to 
Hungary only after 1989, and then as anti-Communist 
fighters.) The same goes for the women’s branch of the 
National Association of Hungarian Physicians (MONE), 
which played a key role in the intellectual embedding 
of the far-right movement. It would require a sepa-
rate study to account for the rightist radicalization of 
women, particularly the shift by the first generation of 
women physicians’ from espousing equality before the 
law to endorsing state-run eugenics. From our point of 
view, however, it is significant that three female phy-
sicians — Dr. Erzsébet Madarász, as well as two other 
members of the National Association of Physicians — 
came under the scrutiny of the People’s Tribunals. By 
1971, Erzsébet Madarász, who had headed the women’s 
branch of the National Association of Physicians, was 
practicing again in Budapest, as a senior physician. 
Apart from Madarász, no other Arrow Cross female 
district leaders feature on this list. 
When we analyzed data for women indicted for 
war crimes according to their occupational status, we 
were surprised to discover that a great proportion of 
these women were classified as housewives, widows, 
or aunts (46 percent). This is surprising because there 
had been no previous institutional mobilization of that 
social stratum.
As far as occupation is concerned, we found two 
other relatively striking features. In 1945, 8 percent of 
the indicted women were concierges or assistant con-
cierges — whereas in the general sample the number 
was only 5 percent. These women were common crimi-
nals who came from a lower middle class or working 
class background. Their activities had been motivated 
by a wish to get their hands on Jewish property. The 
post-war authorities could easily and quickly get their 
hands on the concierges. Those of the concierges who 
did not flee were the first to be denounced by the ordi-
nary residents. This meant that they were drawn into 
the machinery of justice at an early date. In 1950, finally, 
agricultural laborers were strongly over-represented: 
14 percent of those indicted came from this group, 
while the share of agricultural laborers in the general 
population was 6 percent. Thus, contrary to popular 
belief, not only were members of the organization of 
ethnic Germans living in Hungary, the Volksbund, put 
on trial (most of whom had been expelled from the 




The database on “important” female perpetrators held 
by the State Security Historical Archive, which is the 
secret service’s archival database, is not compatible 
with the database in the Budapest City Archives. Both 
databases have logical gaps and logical deficiencies as 
far as their comparability is concerned. This renders 
them inaccurate. Even so, the database of the State 
Security Historical Archive, which is based on docu-
ments from the People’s Tribunals, does reveal which 
people the national security organs focused on.  It also 
tells us something about the functions that the women 
“selected” for surveillance fulfilled in the Arrow Cross 
movement, as well as why they were convicted and 
which sentences they received.
The typical war crime committed by women was 
denunciation (besúgás and feljelentés). If we include the 
denunciation of Hungarian soldiers, then the category 
of “denunciation” accounts for more than 50 percent 
of the crimes committed by the women. 
The data show that more than half of the convicted 
women received a limited punishment of police super-
vision or internment. The data also reveal the state se-
curity organs’ inaccurate record-keeping. According to 
the records, only one woman was sentenced to death, 
and yet we know that at least seven women received 
a death sentence. The exact number of Hungarian 
women sentenced to death is unknown, but it was far 
higher than in the Netherlands and Belgium, where the 
number was one and two, respectively.18
oPPorTuniTies for  
a genDer-baseD  
analysis
The testimonies of women on trial by the People’s Tri-
bunals allow us to map out various reasons why Hun-
garian women joined the extreme right-wing party. We 
have no other testimonies, so we must be keenly aware 
of the limitations of these testimonies. When women 
join political parties, they have a variety of aspirations, 
ideas, and plans. The party leaders defined women as 
an element that would advance their own plans for so-
cial changes. These women defined their own spheres 
of action differently, and they also had alternative as-
sessments of their potential spheres of action. 
A methodical analysis of the confessions and tes-
timonies made at the People’s Tribunals is difficult 
because the accused adjusted their statements to con-
form to expectations and to gain strategic advantages. 
No normal person incriminates him- or herself willing-
ly. Conversely, many are prepared to confess to their 
crimes when tried in a court of law. When defendants 
testify in court, they must select the cultural repertoire 
that will assist them in presenting whatever they have 
to say to their best advantage. In what follows, we shall 
analyze the various factors that influence the selection 
of this cultural repertoire. This will help clarify the 
process by which the accused formulate statements 
about themselves and seek to justify their own deci-
sions and actions by referring to special circumstances 
— thus constructing an image of themselves in a process 
that is not without risks.
In the postwar period, which gave rise to extreme 
power relations, the stories of those who had survived 
the Shoah were heard by nobody.19 A dismissive audi-
ence silenced the narration. There was no rhetorical 
space for a narrative of Jewish identity, as the dominant 
Communist ideology was hostile to the Jewish commu-
nity as a religious group, for ideological reasons, and 
to Zionism, for political reasons, as it threatened the 
assimilation project.20
This phenomenon makes itself felt in language — be-
cause language provides the tools with which a narra-
tor tells his or her story.21 The authoritarian states were 
based on control; they totally dominated the linguistic 
space that was available for the expression of thoughts. 
Meanwhile, the various groups created special mean-
ings in order to establish an identity by invoking episte-
mological space. If we speak of a mediated past rather 
than an immediate past, we come close to resolving the 
dilemma of how to view these sources. The sphere of 
such mediation was the family. The family made up a 
space that was closed to state intervention and direct 
regulatory power. Identity was established within the 
family, with a dividing line drawn between “us” and 
“them” — between those Hungarians who supported 
the Soviets and those who opposed them. The Hungar-
ians who defined themselves as “non-Communists” 
— and non-Communism was the cornerstone of the 
self-definition of anyone involved in crime or criminal 
activities committed during the years of Soviet occupa-
tion — were those Hungarians who saw themselves as 
victims of Communism. They developed a language 
of the victim, a counter-discourse, which would al-
low them to tell their stories in a political discourse 
dominated by Communism. After 1945, the language 
of “Communist crimes” became the language of the 
minority discourse — which was developed against 
the majority’s suppression, and which became a de-
parture point for establishing a self-identity.22 Thus, 
those female defendants whose “cultural repertoire”, 
to use Michele Lamont’s expression, accorded with the 
anticipated mode of remembering, received relatively 
light sentences. They were handled more leniently 
than were men who committed the same offense. Here, 
gender strategies worked to the advantage of women: 
women received light sentences as compared to males 
who had committed the very same crime. The “master 
frame” of becoming a victim created an opportunity 
for improvisation. The definition of autobiographical 
remembering as “an improvisational activity that 
forms emergent selves which give us a sense of needed 
comfort and a culturally valued sense of personal 
coherence over time” is called into question by the 
traumatic events of the 20th century and particularly by 
the Shoah, which, as Craig Barclay has shown, removed 
any possibility of “metaphoric mapping”. 23
Remembering occurs in a mythical way, establish-
ing a more or less similar self-representation which is 
similar to the others. If, as Roland Barthes claims, a 
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text is a security system for the ego, then creating a life 
story provides the narrator with illusory or imaginary 
control not only over the narrative but also over life 
itself.24 This is the control that the women who stood 
accused at the People’s Tribunals believed that they 
possessed. The defendants thus tried to construct a 
coherent self-representation, mindful of the fact that 
a single error would lead to their imprisonment for 
years. In the courtroom, the ability to give a perfect 
theater performance became a matter of life or death.
The hisTory of  
non-aCknowleDgeD  
aCTors in soCieTy
A gender-sensitive analysis of political and social dis-
course is made particularly difficult by the fact that the 
identity-shaping power of the discourses establishes 
homogenous and exclusive units. In times of war, wom-
en are portrayed as loyal mothers and citizens who 
send their sons to war — or as the reverse, collaborators 
who are a threat to the soldiers’ morals. The question 
is: where do we find subjectivity in these personal 
narratives? As far as sources related to criminal cases 
are concerned, we face particular difficulties, for if we 
regard them as “legends” — to use Paul Thompson’s 
expression — then they are of a fixed structure and con-
form to the socially accepted system. The court creates 
a lineal, single-threaded, exclusive narrative regime, 
and the accused has to find his or her place within this 
regime. In this situation, female defendants were faced 
with dual discrimination.
Feminist researchers are sensitive to the develop-
ment of various power hierarchies and appreciate the 
consequences of such hierarchies.25 Concerning the 
court trial records, power relations among the various 
actors differ significantly — not merely as a result of the 
hierarchy and politics of the legal system itself, but also 
because of differences between defendants and plain-
tiffs in terms of social status and gender and the degree 
of their embeddedness in various social networks. The 
more embedded a defendant was (with correspond-
ing access to information and assistance), the easier 
she found it to manipulate the court, and thus, often, 
secure an acquittal.
The story is shaped by the defendant’s confession or 
testimony and is based on her responses to questions. 
At the People’s Tribunals, the questions were posed by 
men, for women were not employed as lawyers, judges 
or public prosecutors. All the court officials were men; 
not until 1945 were women allowed to pursue a legal 
career. The court’s gender policy is obvious, judging 
from the data. Women defendants who portrayed 
themselves as weak and powerless victims who had 
submissively complied with the suggestions and initia-
tives of men received lighter sentences. The stories of 
the female accused are “silent”, because these women 
managed, while in the courtroom, to exploit “legends”, 
thus avoiding a search for individual expressions, 
meanings, and thoughts. The end result was that they 
were not required to express themselves as individu-
als. The diversity of the legends, and the many different 
ways in which they could be used, provided many of 
the women with a means to obtain lighter sentencing. 
On the other hand, stories of an individual nature did 
not accord with the court’s cognitive sample. Accord-
ingly, politically active women received harsher sen-
tences. A gender-based analysis may, thus, contribute 
to a better understanding of the complex legacy of 
the People’s Tribunals and the effect of this legacy on 
contemporary Hungarian society. It may help us un-
derstand why a former officer and interrogator of the 
State Protection Authority cannot recall a single Arrow 
Cross woman. Å
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